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COLLOQUIUM
FOREWORD
MILTON V. FREEMAN

I

would like to express my special pleasure of being here at Fordham
Law School because about seven or eight years ago some student editor of the Law School Journal cited Rule lOb-5 as the work of the "late"
Milton Freeman. Indeed, reports of my death had been "greatly exaggerated." He was very nice when I wrote him back. It was natural for a
young person in law school to think that nobody could have survived
from that long ago.
First about me. I graduated from City College and Columbia Law
School in New York City. I worked for eleven and one-half years in the
government, mostly with the SEC, and four times that long with my
present law firm, Arnold & Porter, which I helped found in January,
1946.
I have done many fine things in my law practice. For example, I argued and won a case in the Supreme Court saying it was unconstitutional
to abridge the right of naturalized citizens to live anywhere they wanted
just like born citizens.' My partners and I defended extensively the
rights of government employees in the McCarthy era not to be fired on
the basis of unsworn anonymous accusations. The results were mixed. 2 I
also litigated and wrote against the tendency of certain government agencies to limit the right of citizens to the assistance of counsel.'
On a personal note, the New York Times says I set a record when, on
April 21, 1975, I secured the admission to the Supreme Court of my wife,
my elder daughter, and my elder son on the assurance that each possessed the necessary qualifications.
But, however many good works I engaged in, it is clear that the action
of the most consequence to the law in general was the drafting of Rule
lob-5 when I was at the SEC. Therefore, I must say something about
how it happened.
I went to work one day in May, 1942, and I did my normal job as an
Assistant Solicitor of the SEC. Somebody called me and said there is
something wrong going on in Boston (a company president was buying in
shares from his own shareholders without telling them of much improved earnings). He asked what we could do about it. I wasted no
time; I got some people in, we drafted a rule, we presented it to the Com1. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1964).

2. Compare Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (per curiam) (holding against
Freeman et al.) with Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) (holding in favor of Freeman et
al.); see Milton V. Freeman, Abe Fortas: A Man of Courage, 91 Yale LJ. 1052 (1982).
3. See eg., Milton V. Freeman, Recent Government Attacks on the PrivateLawyer as
an Infringement of the ConstitutionalRight to the Assistance of Counsel, 36 Bus. Law.
1791 (1981).
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mission, and, without any hesitation, the Commission tossed the paper
on the table saying they were in favor of it. One Commission member
said, "Well, we're against fraud, aren't we?" So, before the sun was
down, we had the rule that is now Rule lOb-5. (This, of course, was
before the Administrative Procedure Act of 19461).
I do not remember who I asked in to help me, so I have had to take the
blame for this all by myself. Very happily, though, in the corridors today, I ran into Professor Victor Brudney-who at that time was working
with me in the Securities and Exchange Commission-and I now offer to
include him in the credits, or demerits, as a possible co-author of this
rule.
To show you how innocent I was of any application of the Rule, I left
the Securities and Exchange Commission in January, 1946, to form with
Thurman Arnold and Abe Fortas my current law firm which was then
known as Arnold & Fortas. So far as I knew, nothing had happened at
that time under Rule lOb-5. I assumed that our Boston people had
frightened off the bad fellow who had done the bad thing. When I left to
go into practice there were no cases under the Rule.
The first case that came up was Kardon v. National Gypsum - where a
practicing lawyer in Philadelphia had decided that this Rule was the basis for a private law suit. Obviously neither I, nor the Commission that
promulgated the Rule, had any such idea when the Rule was adopted.
By the time the suit was decided, I had been long gone as Assistant Solicitor of the Securities and Exchange Commission. My former boss, Roger
Foster, Solicitor of the Commission, filed an amicus brief. I have not
been able to check, but I am sure the brief supported the view that there
would be a cause of action, because the SEC has filed very few briefs in
favor of defendants. I had absolutely nothing to do with that case,
although I was, in fact, pleased in my law practice that within a reasonable period of time my legal services were required in connection with
litigation involving the Rule.
Nothing of real consequence, however, happened until about 1966. At
that time I attended a meeting in Chicago of the American Bar Association Business Law Section, later called the Codification Conference,
which approved the idea that the American Law Institute should undertake to codify the securities laws. At that meeting there was gossip in the
corridors about "Milton Freeman's Rule lOb-5." I believed it was necessary and appropriate to stand6 up and take responsibility and to say what
had happened, and I did so.
I thought that would be the end of it and nobody would reproach me
any further. But a little later, there was a decision in a case called Escott
v. BarChris by which Judge McLean here in the Southern District had
4. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1988)).
5. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
6. See 22 Bus. Law. 921 (1967).
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found lawyer directors liable under the Securities Act.7
Thereafter, I was called on to make a speech to a large Bar Association
meeting at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel to reassure the bar that if they
acted only as lawyers they were not liable under that case.' To my surprise, the chairman of the meeting introduced me as the author of Rule
lOb-5. My response to this was: "I am driven to quote Shakespeare:
'The evil that men do lives after them.' "I I then got to be known as the
"father" of Rule lOb-5. At some bar conference in Virginia I pointed out
that "even when paternity is established, it is well known how little control parents have over their children when they grow up." 10
At that point I was most reluctant to endorse the Rule as it was then
sought to be interpreted. For I was afraid that the Rule was being subject by plaintiffs, governmental and private, to arguments for expansion
to an extent that I believed it was in danger of becoming a loose cannon.
For example, plaintiffs urged that the words of the Rule "in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security" meant "not in connection with
the purchase12or sale of a security."' 1 They urged that "fraud" meant
"negligence" and that "immaterial" meant "material." 3 Furthermore,
the SEC sought to say that any illegal act by a public corporation would
have to be disclosed as "material" even if it would have no effect on any
investment decision. I spoke and wrote in criticism of this position."
The SEC abandoned this view and it was finally interred in United States
v. Matthews.'5
Of course, the Rule has been widely applied. Justice Rehnquist referred to the Rule as "a judicial oak which has grown from little more
than a legislative acorn."' 6 It became the subject of extensive publications not only by Professor Langevoort, but also by Professors Loss and
Bromberg, and Arnold Jacobs among others.
During this period, I was not an absentee parent. Besides writing, I
participated in some of the important cases (for example, as counsel in
TSC 17 for petitioner and in Aaron' 8 as counsel for the Securities Industry Association as amicus curiae).
Fortunately, the Supreme Court and the other courts put a stop to the
expansion efforts of plaintiffs, and current construction of the Rule is
7. Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8. See 24 Bus. Law. 523 (1969).
9. 24 Bus. Law. 635 (1969).
10. 31 Bus. Law. 982 n.4 (1976).
11. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
12. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 189-91 (1975).
13. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 441 (1976).
14. See The Legality of the SEC's Management FraudProgram, 31 Bus. Law. 1295
(1976).
15. 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986).
16. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
17. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 440 (1976).
18. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 682 (1980).
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much more in line with what I believe the Commission intended. Accordingly, I am no longer in doubt but, indeed, I am glad to accept responsibility for the Rule as currently applied.
About four years ago, I was in Chicago for a meeting of the American
Law Institute discussing the provision of its Corporate Governance Project relating to derivative stockholders lawsuits. I proposed on behalf of
a distinguished group of lawyers a relatively simple solution to the
problem.
The proposal was attacked by an academic friend as follows: He said,
Now, Milton Freeman... is fond of simple solutions. In 1942, he gave
us Rule lOb-5. Many of us make a living as a result of Rule lOb-5, and
I'm sure Milton Freeman would be candid if he acknowledged that he
had no idea what in fact he had given us. Forty-six years later, we are
still trying to construe what it means.
I replied:
It has been alleged that in 1942 I expressed my approval of simplicity
in drafting and adopting Rule lOb-5. I used to respond, as I said, by
quoting Shakespeare. However, under the present attack, I shall take a
different approach. It seems to me that I should be complimented
rather than attacked for having, over this long period of time, continued my devotion to the advantages of simplicity over complexity. Rule
lOb-5, it is true, is a very simple Rule; it outlaws fraud in securities
transactions .... [P]eople have argued a lot about that, but nobody,
not even the learned gentlemen who have taken my name in vain, have
suggested any way similar to that of the reporters in this case, in which
Rule lOb-5 can be improved by complexity.
Shortly after this exchange, a young lawyer came up to me and said,
"I'd like to shake your hand." After this was done, I asked what his
interest was in Rule lOb-5. He said "None, I just wanted to shake the
hand of somebody who did anything forty-six years ago."
Professor Langevoort"9 has indicated that Rule lOb-5 is likely to survive as a Rule for the long future. I hope this will be the case if the
flexibility he attributes to the Rule is not again subjected to an attempt to
expand it beyond its present scope.
One of the lesser but important questions that remains unresolved that
I think is appropriate to mention is the idea of construing the rule to
outlaw transactions that do not involve a fraud on investors but only on
other people (a contention labelled by the SEC as "the misappropriation
theory"). In the Wall Street Journal case,2 ° a columnist gave personal
analysis, for example "General Motors is about to move" or "IBM is
going down."'" He accepted money for letting people know before publi19. See Donald C. Langevoort, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Happy Birthday lOb-5: Fifty Years of Antifraud Regulation, Rule 10b-5 as an
Adaptive Organism, 61 Fordham L. Rev. S7 (1993).
20. See Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
21. Id. at 22.
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cation what his recommendations would be. He had no connection with
the management of General Motors; he did not know anything about
GM or IBM or any of the others about which he wrote. His information
was not inside information. It was merely analysis on the basis of public
information. What he was doing was betraying his employer by revealing the information before it was published. He was indicted for mail
fraud and for violation of Rule lOb-5.
In the Supreme Court of the United States, the Solicitor General argued that the publisher was entitled to have its own information kept
confidential until published and that this was a property right of which
the Journal was defrauded.
The Supreme Court unanimously sustained this argument under the
mail fraud law. However, the Court divided four to four on the question
of whether the reporter also violated Rule lOb-5. The issue was basically
whether the Rule applied only to protect investors or did it also outlaw
conduct that cheated only an employer and not any investor?
I testified before a Senate Committee that that construction of the Rule
was inappropriate; that, although the conduct should be outlawed, it was
not that with which Rule lOb-5 was meant to deal. I felt a rule adopted
under an investor protection law should be construed to be limited to the
purpose of investor protection.
I argued, therefore, that there should be a separate statute not sounding in securities fraud or investor protection, specifically outlawing trading on information improperly obtained from any source. I supplied a
draft of the bill.'
While I believed that I had the support of the SEC for this proposal,
when it came to hearings, the SEC solemnly advised the Senate that they
saw six reasons why they should support the draft and six reasons why
they should not.2 3 Of course, this failure of support killed the proposal.
In the famous Siegel, Boesky, and Milken cases, the people who were
cheated were the employers of Siegel-that is, mostly, Drexel. It is easy
to understand that the SEC in their anti-Milken, anti-Drexel campaign at
the time was not about to say: "Drexel has been injured and we are
going to see that they get a lot of money." They were similarly not about
to make a check out to the Wall Street Journal.
I think it is appropriate for the Congress of the United States to say
that the kind of thing that Messrs. Boesky and Siegel did should be illegal. It should be made illegal independently of whether it is fraud on
investors. Accordingly, I was very much impressed with the analysis
that Professor Langevoort has made and I agree with a great deal of it. 4
22. See The Insider TradingSanctions Act of 1984: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 35 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings];The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
23. See Hearings, supra note 22, at 35-36.
24. See Langevoort, supra note 19.

S6

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

But I want to say one more thing in my defense: Jim Sargent, a former
SEC Commissioner and a friend, whom I know as one of the few Republicans I would trust with public office, suggested that I should be invited
to your happy 50th birthday party for Rule lOb-5. Professor Langevoort
has graciously allowed me the opportunity to make these observations
and I thank him deeply, and I also especially thank Jim Sargent and
Professor Felsenfeld.
Supplementary Comment
Two months after my appearance at Fordham, I spoke similarly at a
meeting of the Securities Regulation Institute in Coronado, California.
The Institute then conferred on me a certificate. It was drafted with gentle humor by two of the most prominent and sophisticated practitioners
in the country (Meyer Eisenberg and Robert Mundheim). Since it refers
specifically to Professor Langevoort and, in my view does not depart too
far from the truth, I believe it may be worth including as an independent
comment on the rule and my part in it:
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the adoption of Rule lOb-5
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 the Securities Regulation Institute of the University of California at San Diego is pleased
and honored to recognize the signal contribution of our distinguished
colleague and Advisory Board member (Emeritus), Milton Freeman,
to the field of securities regulation, and particularly as the Father of
Rule lOb-5, whose anniversary we celebrate.
Mr. Freeman took the vague language of Section 10(b) and turned it
into a sharply defined rule, which has become the SEC's weapon of
choice against fraud and the most utilized basis for shareholder class
actions, involving real or perceived securities fraud. The rule reaches
conduct and activities far beyond what the SEC of fifty years ago or
Mr. Freeman and his colleagues ever contemplated. Indeed, Mr. Freeman has made a career of containing the scope of the Rule which he
fathered-with only modest success. Alas, a father can only rarely
control the conduct of his children.
The members of the Securities Bar wish to thank Mr. Freeman for
the opportunity he created for the expansion of their practice and the
consequent financing of the college and professional education of
thousands of students at this country's finest institutions of higher
learning, including, of course, the University of California. Professors
Loss, Bromberg, and Langevoort, among others, wish to thank Mr.
Freeman for providing sufficient grist for their scholarly mill to sell
tens of thousands of copies of their books and articles. The Securities
and Exchange Commission wishes to thank Mr. Freeman for providing a basis for ever expanding jurisdiction, larger budgets, and more
numerous staff. Finally, the Securities Regulation Institute wishes to
thank Mr. Freeman, for without his work product and annual commentary, these conferences would
be far less interesting and much less
25
exciting than they have been.
25. A copy of the certificate is on file with the Fordham Law Review.

